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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
Where the issue is not regarding a lost will, testimony as to what
the testator said after making the will, in relation to the causes which
influenced him in making it, is incompetent, as hearsay evidence.32 But
as to quantum and quality of proof, a clear distinction has been drawn
between a mere will contest and the proof of a lost will. In the case
of a lost will of whose contents secondary evidence alone is obtainable,
what the testator himself said about it may be admitted to corroborate
other substantial evidence of the due execution and the loss of the will,
and that it was not subsequently revoked.3 3
C. SIDNEY NEUHOrF.
THE ELEMENT OF "MALICE" IN THE TORT ACTION
FOR INDUCING BREACH OF CONTRACT
To a novice in the law many commonplace words are confusing as
having a peculiar legal meaning quite different from their inflexible lay
usage; and of this class one of the most elusive is "malice." Nor do
the courts enlighten one much, though their definitions are impressive
tributes to the casuistry of modern judges who carry on in a venerable
scholastic spirit by repeating the ancient platitudes concerning malice,
the gist of all of which seems to be that malice is wrong and therefore
wrongful-for to the juridical mind there is evidently some nice dis-
tinction between the adjective and the noun-a wrongful act is an act
without legal justification and therefore an unlawful act, and therefore
an actionable one. In an early authority we read, "A malicious act is
in law and fact a wrong act and therefore a wrongful act and therefore
actionable if injury ensues,"' and subsequently this definition is ac-
cepted as authoritative. Or to put it in the unimpeachable and uni-
versal formula: "Malice is the intentional doing of a wrongful act with-
out just cause or excuse."'2 The weight of authority behind these
formulas is impressive, but as Sir Frederick Pollock remarks, "We do
not need the House of Lords to tell us that a wrongful procurement of
a breach of contract is wrongful or that an unlawful act or an act with-
out lawful justification is unlawful." As to what constitutes lawful
justification, the courts are vague and ambiguous, or absolutely silent.
The difficulty seems to be that in the early days of the action, the
courts were trying to circumvent a maxim generally relied on at that
time, and upheld by such an able jurist as Cooley: that "Malicious
motives make a bad case worse, but they cannot make that wrong which
Schierbaum v. Schemme, 157 Mo. 1, 57 S. W. 526, 80 Am. St. Rep. 604; Wal-
ton v. Kendrick, 122 Mo. 54, 27 S. W. 872, 25 L. R. A. 701.
' Charles v. Charles supra, footnote 4; Mann v. Balfour, supra footnote 20.
'Bowen v. Hall, 6 Q. B. D. 333.
2Brennan v. United Hatters of No. America Local No. 17, 73 N. 3. L. 729, 65
At. 165; So. Wales Miners' Fed. v. Glomorgan Coal Co. A. C. (1905) 239, 244;
Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555 (1871); Beekman v. Marsters, 195 Mass. 205
(1907); Campbell v. Gates, 236 N. Y., 457; Wheeler Stenzel Co. v. Am. Window
Glass Co., 202 Mass. 471; Lamb v. Cheney, 227 N. Y. 418; Luke v. Du Pree, 124
S. E. 13.
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is in its essence lawful."'3  That is, if it was lawful to induce another to
break his contract bona fide, it was lawful to induce him to break it
mala fide, for the act must be not only the direct cause of the damage,
but also a legal wrong, else it is damnum absque injuria.. This theory
was upheld by Lord Chief Justice Coleridge, dissenting in Bowen V.
Hall' in support of Sir John Coleridge's dissenting opinion in Lumley
v. Gye.5 He believes the action should not lie, for, "If a man ma-
liciously, (i. e., with intent to injure the plaintiff), tries to persuade
another to break his contract but fails, the malicious motive is not in
itself actionable; also if a man persuades another to break his contract
but does it without malice, the resulting damage is not actionable. But
if the damage which is not actionable be joined to a motive which is
not actionable, the two together form a cause of action. This is fal-
lacy. . . Except in the case of Lumley v. Gye, it has never been held
that the same person for doing the same thing under the same circum-
stances with the same result is actionable or not according to whether
his inward motive was selfish or unselfish. Judges are not very fit for
such inquiries, and juries are very unfit."
But the trend of opinion seemed to be to allow the action; and to
combat the plausible argument of Justice Coleridge, the courts formu-
lated the syllogisms that malice was wrongful and therefore wrong;
wrong is unlawful and therefore a tort, and therefore actionable.
Malice was at first said to be one of the essential elements of the tort,6
and most courts still repeat the conventional formula, but much am-
biguity prevails as to what really constitutes "malice." The varying
opinions can be grouped into four classes.
I. (a) The distinction that malice was no more than knowledge of
an existing contract was made early in the history of the action7 and is
still followed by many jurisdictions, but it seems hardly tenable, as
knowledge is a prerequisite of the false tort, without which no action
lies. That is, if the defendant induced the breach without knowledge
of the contract, the action, of course, does not lie and therefore to make
knowledge of an existing contract the basis of malice is to presume
malice in every action. (b) A second group of cases in this class,
like Beckman v. Marsters,8 make the formula unimpeachable but mean-
ingless by the addition of the phrase, "without just cause."
II. The second theory is that the test of malice is whether the de-
fendant induced the breach to benefit himself or to injure the plain-
tiff, and that if he acted from either of these motives, his act was ma-
licious. Thus the action would lie if the defendant acted to spite the
plaintiff or to benefit himself in any way, either by procuring the plain-
tiff's promised contract rights or by securing some indirect benefit for
which he procured the breach. This would seem to be the most tenable
'Cooley, ToRTs, (1888), 497; Chambers et al. v. Baldwin, 15 S. W. 57; Bourlier
et al. v. Macauley, 15 S. W. 60; Jenkins v. Fowler, 24 Pa. St. 308.
'Bowen v. Hall, supra, note 1. 'Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & BI. 216.
'Lumley v. Gye, supra, note 5; Bowen v. Hall, supra, note 1; Temperton v.
Russell (1893) 12 B. 715.
'Crompton, J., Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & BI. 216, 224. 'Supra, note 2.
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distinction. It was suggested first by Lord Brett in Bowen v. Hall,9
and later enlarged upon by Lord Justice Smith in Temperton v. Rus-
sell.1 If malice is to have a peculiar legal meaning in these actions,
this is perhaps the most workable distinction.
III. A less sweeping distinction than this, covering only half the field,
is that cited in McCann v. Wolff,"' that malice is "the intent to harm the
plaintiff." This definition is good as far as it goes and covers cases
in which the defendant was actuated by sheer spite or ill-will toward
the plaintiff, such as Lumley v. Gye,1 where the defendant's only ob-
ject was to injure Lumley. But under this doctrine the action would
not lie against a defendant who induced breach of a trade contract in
order to secure the contract benefits or some other benefits for him-
self. Courts generally now allow the action in such cases, some hold-
ing that even trade competition is not lawful justification.
IV. The still narrower distinction is pointed to by Pollock13 and care-
fully worked out by Mr. Sayre in the Harvard Law Review.14 He dis-
tinguishes, first between the mere incidental causing of an undesired
breach of contract, which should not be actionable, and the actual pro-
curing of a desired breach of contract, which should be actionable. So
far the distinction holds. But he goes on to say that the test of
"malice" must be the conscious intention to appropriate for oneself the
promised advantages of another, i. e., if the defendant's object in induc-
ing the breach was the same as the plaintiff's object in making the con-
tract, the defendant is liable. To be sure, the defendant is liable in
this case, but he may also be liable if he induced the breach with an
object foreign to the plaintiff's. Under a strict interpretation of Mr.
Sayre's definition, if the defendant was moved by sheer animosity to-
ward the plaintiff, he would not be liable, for his object is not the same
as the plaintiff's object in making the contract. Undoubtedly Mr.
Sayre did not really mean that such action ought not to lie, in such a
case. Or if A had a contract with B, and C had a wager on the out-
come of the contract and therefore induced B to break his contract so
that C could collect his bet, is not C liable? Most jurisdictions would
allow the action; yet his object was foreign to the plaintiff's object in
making the contract. The last part of Mr. Sayre's definition, therefore,
seems too sweeping, but it is the epitome of his views. As Mr. Sayre
points out, the courts have not yet formulated his suggested distinction
of the grounds for malice, but it seems to be supported by cases like
Nulty v. Hart-Bradshaw Lumber & Grain Co.,- where the court held
that one who conspires to assist another in violating his contract with a
third person, and thereby obtains the benefit of that contract for him-
self, is liable in damages. However, Mr. Sayre's first distinction be-
tween causing and procuring a breach of contract is a plausible test of
malice, and it is to be questioned whether this distinction or the defini-
"Supra, note 1. "Supra, note 6.t McCann v. Wolff, 28 Mo. App. 447. 1"Supra, note 6.
Pollock, TORTS, 12th ed. pp. 330-32. 14361 HARV. LAW REVIEW, 663.
227 Pac. 254.
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tion in Class II is to be preferred; the practical result of either would
be much the same.
A review of the important cases for this action will best show the
varying ideas of what constitutes malice. As pointed out by Mr.
Sayre,"8 there are exceptional contract rights, such as contracts to
marry"7 and peculiar labor contracts in which, for reasons of public
policy, no action ought to lie, in spite of the required element of
"malice." The opinions concerning malice in such cases are therefore
less important and most case of this sort will not be considered in the
following retrospect.
To begin with Lumley v. Gye,'8 the supposed archetype of the action,
decided in 1853: the defendant in that case out of sheer animosity to-
ward the plaintiff, induced an artist, Miss Wagner, to break a contract
to sing for the plaintiff for a certain period. The defendant did not
need her services himself and his only motive was hostility toward the
plaintiff. The court allowed the action in this case, but such an action
was limited to cases where (1) the contract was one to render extlusive
personal services and (2) where the defendant's act was "malicious."
What constitutes a malicious act was not stated, but it is clear from
the circumstances of the case that the court used the term in its popular
sense, i. e. malevolent or spiteful.
Justice Coleridge in a dissenting opinion believes the action ought
not to lie whether the breach was maliciously procured or not. A "ma-
licious" act he defines as an act done mala fide. For inducing another
in bad faith to break his contract with a third person, the action should
not lie, he says, for it is malitio sine damno, and the act is entirely that
of the contracting party,"* for which he alone should be liable.
But according to the majority opinion the action will lie, and the
case thus falls under Class III in which "malice" is the intent to injure
the plaintiff. Bowen v. Hall20 like Lumley v. Gye, supra, was the case
of procuring a breach of a contract to render exclusive personal service.
The court allowed the action, but based its decision on the "malice" of
the defendant, holding that apart from the question of malice, the dis-
senting opinion of Justice Coleridge in Lumley v. Gye was the better
opinion and that the action should not lie except for master and servant
contracts under the Statute of Labourers. 21 Lord Justice Brett in com-
menting on Lumley v. Gye said that merely to persuade a person to
break his contract may not be wrongful in law and in fact. "The test
is whether the persuasion be used for the indirect purpose of injuring
the plaintiff or of benefiting the defendant at the expense of the plain-
tiff. It is then a malicious act which is in law and fact a wrong act,
and therefore a wrongful act, and therefore actionable if injury en-
sues." Bowen v. Hall therefore comes under Class II.
In 1893, in Temperton v. Russell, 22 a similar question was involved.
" Sayre, "Inducing Breach of Contract." 36 HARVARD LAW REVIEW, 663.
"Leonard v. Whetstone, 34 Ind. App. 383; Homan v. Hall, 165 N. W. 881;
Guida v. Pontrelli, 186 N Y. S. 147; Hiffler v. Boehm, 124 Misc. Rep. (N. Y.) 55.
n Supra, note. " See Lumley v. Gye, supra, note 5.
"Supra, note 1. ' 23 Edward III.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol12/iss4/7
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In this case the defendants had no personal malice or spite toward the
plaintiff, but they attempted by an illegal boycott to coerce the plaintiff
and force him to boycott his brother who would not agree to their rules.
The defendants refused to work for any builders whose materials were
supplied by the plaintiff, thus inducing others not to enter into pros-
pective contracts with him, and inducing the builders to break existing
contracts with him.
The defense pleaded that the action would not lie unless the plain-
tiff could show they had induced the breach "maliciously," i. e. "in order
to injure the plaintiff or to obtain for himself the benefit to which the
plaintiff was entitled under the contract." Thus the defense relied on
Mr. Sayre's definition of malice. The court does not sustain this de-
fense however but affirms the definition of the judge of the lower
court who, in charging the jury, explained the term "maliciously":
"The defendant acted maliciously if he induced the breach of the con-
tract in order to hurt the plaintiff, to hamper him in his trade, . . . or to
procure some indirect advantage for the person himself (i. e. the de-
fendant). To induce a breach of contract from any of these motives
is to do it maliciously." Temperton v. Russell, therefore falls under
Class II. The basis of this decision seems to be the malevolence of the
plaintiffs in practising an illegal boycott; and the court held that the
action would lie even in cases where the defendants merely induced the
breach of prospective contracts by preventing others from contracting
with him. (Subsequent cases, however, do not support this last). It
is interesting to note that in the same year in which Temperton v. Russell
extended the action in England, a Kentucky court in a very able opin-
ion held that the action should not be extended even to employment
contracts.
2 3
In 1898 Allen v. Flood2 4 held by the House of Lords is not really a
case for inducing breach of contract at all, inasmuch as the plaintiffs
had no contracts with their employers, but it is of much interest for
Lord Herschell's discussion of "malice" and the comments on Lunley
v. Gye and Bowen v. Hall. The plaintiffs were shipwrights-employed
to repair a ship but were not under contract. Some ironworkers em-
ployed on the ship objected to the presence of the plaintiffs on the
ground that they (the plaintiffs) had previously done iron work and
infringed on the defendants' trade rights. A delegate of the defend-
ants' union induced the employers to discharge the shipwrights, who are
now suing the defendant for inducing their discharge. The court held
that no contract rights were infringed and the act was lawful; and that
an act lawful in itself is not converted by a malicious or bad motive
into an unlawful act so as to make the doer of the act liable to a civil
action. We quote from Lord Herschell's opinion on malice: Malice
is not a question to be left to the jury, for no one would know what his
rights were, and the result would be to put every action at the mercy of
a particular tribunal. "The essence of the tort (in Lumley v. Gye)
'Temperton v. Russell (1893), 12 B. 715.
"See Bourlier et al. v. Macauley, 91 Ry. 135.
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was .. .the procuring one person to do an unlawful act to the injury
of another." "Maliciously," he thinks, means only "wilfully and with
notice of the contract." (Class Ia.) "If it was a lawful act, however
ill the motive might be, he had a right to do it." This case was im-
portant, too, as overruling Keeble v. Heckeringill,25 which was supposed
to have stated the principle that where the defendant is actuated by
pure malevolence, where his sole motive is to injure the plaintiff, his
act otherwise legal, may become illegal.
Quinn v. Leathem26 decided in the House of Lords in 1901 affirms
Lumley v. Gye and Leathem v. Craig.27 It is a case much like Temper-
ton v. Russell;2 8 the defendants induced a butcher not to receive meat
from the plaintiff because he employed non-union men. Lord Mac-
naghten in discussing Lumley v. Gye says the decision was right on the
ground that a violation of a legal right committed knowingly is a cause
of action, and it is a violation of a legal right to interfere with con-
tractual relations recognized by law if there be no sufficient justification
for the interference. (See Class I). But Lord Shand is of the opinion
"wrongfully and maliciously to induce the breach" was to induce it with
the sole intent to injure the plaintiff (Class III). Lord Brampton too,
seems to be of the opinion that malice is the intent to injure the plaintiff,
as is the majority of the court.
Another famous case came before the House of Lords in 1905, the
South Wales Miners' Federation v. Glamorgan Coal Company.2' The
coal company was under contract with its miners to give thirty days'
notice to terminate contracts but the Miners' Federation ordered several
"stop-days" to boost the price of coal, when the men left without giving
the notice required by contract. The coal company sues the" Miners'
Federation, its trustees, and officers for maliciously inducing the miners
to break their contracts. So far as the defendants' motive was con-
cerned, the court in allowing the action, admitted that there was no
malevolence on the defendants' part, but held that malevolence was not
an essential part of the tort. The court was vague as to the meaning
of malice: Justice Bigham, the trial judge, ruled that malice, i. e.
malevolence, was essential to the tort, but his judgment is overruled,
the House of Lords holding that it is now settled that malice in the,
sense of spite or ill will is not the gist of the action. As to what is the
gist of the action, they are not clear, though all agree that the fact that
the defendants advised them bona fide for the best interests of the
miners, is no defense, which seems to put the case in Class I (b).
Turning from England to America we find a few scattered and ob-
scure cases which antedate Lumley v. Gye. There were English cases
analogous to Lumley v. Gye and antedating it,30 but probably because
of the fame and authority of the judges, Lumley v. Gye is considered
the archetype of the action. Aldridge v. Stuyvesant (1828) 31 decided
(1898) A. C. 1. ' 11 East. 574n. (1706). " (1901) A. C.
Leathem v. Craig (1899), 2 I. 1R 667, decided in the Irish Ct of Appeals.
Supra, note 2. ' Supra, note 28.
'See Green v. Button, 2 C. M. & R. 707. The defendant in that case had ad-
vanced money to the plaintiff to pay for some battins, and later the defendant
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol12/iss4/7
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in the Superior Court of New York, was a case in which the landlord
sues the defendant for wrongfully and maliciously disturbing his ten-
ants (who were tenants for years) and forcing them to vacate, depriv-
ing the landlord of his rent. The court in this case allowed the action,
Judge Oakley stating that he believed "that this was an action of the
first impression," but one which was clearly maintainable on principle,
and citing as authority Comyn's Digest and Yates v. Joyce,32 in which
the court held that "where the fraudulent misconduct of a party occa-
sions an injury to the private rights of another, he shall be responsible
in damages." Judge Oakley said he believed this case (Aldridge v.
Stuyvesant) came within that principle, for the defendant maliciously
intending to injure the plaintiff so disturbed his tenants that they
abandoned the possession, whereby he lost his rent which he would
otherwise have received.
It may be objected that a lease is not, properly speaking, a contract,
and that this is not therefore an action for inducing breach of contract,
but the principle is, if anything, broader than that laid down in Luntley
v. Gye where the action was limited to contracts of personal service.
It is of significance, too, that both cases cite Chief Baron Comyn's
Digest as authority for the principle that "in all cases where a man has
a temporal loss or damage by the wrong of another, he may have an
action on the case to be repaired in damages"83 and also for the proposi-
tion that "if a man threaten the tenants of another, whereby they depart
from their tenures, an action lies" 33a Cowling cited Comyn in arguing
for the plaintiff in Luntley v. Gye, saying that as tenants are not in any
sense servants, it cannot be said that the action for procurement is an
anomaly confined to master and servant cases. From these citations it
would seem that prior to Lumley v. Gye, courts both in England and
America allowed the action for inducing breach of contract.
Looking to Aldridge v. Stuyvesant, supra, for a definition of malice,
we find Judge Oakley holding that the defendants wrongfully and ma-
falsely claimed a lien on them and prevented their delivery. Held: The action
lies because of the wrongful act of defendant. Also Sheperd v. Wakeman, 1
Sid. 79 (1673) where the action was for asserting the plaintiff was married
#per quod she lost her marriage. Defendant procured breach of a marriage
contract by asserting that the plaintiff was already married. Blake v. Lanyon,
6 T. R. 221, where the court held that an action will lie for continuing to employ
the servant of another, after notice, without having enticed him away, and al-
though the defendant had received the servants innocently. See especially
Taylor v. Neri, 1 Esp. N. P. C. 386 which bears directly on Lumley v. Gye. The
plaintiff, manager of the opera house, had engaged a certain artist to sing, and
the defendant beat the artist whereby the plaintiff was deprived of his services.
The case was decided at Nisi Prius, and was very little discussed but Lord Chief
Justice Eyre "doubted whether the action was maintainable, observing that if
such action lay, every person, whose servant, whether domestic or not, was
kept away a day from business, could maintain an action." He believed the
singer was not a servant at all. Wightman, J., in Lumley v. Gye.
" N. Y. Super Ct. 1, p. 210. '11 Johns. Rep. p. 136.
'Lumley v. Gye. Cowling for the plaintiff, citing ComyN's DIGEST, Action
on the Case (a).
"aCowling, citing ComYN's DIGEST, Action on the Case for Misfeasance, (a6),
and citing also 1 ROLLE'S ABRIDGMENT, 108, and the Year Book 9 Hy vii, p. 8.
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liciously intended to injure the plaintiff. "Here is certain damage to
the plaintiff . . . alleged to have been caused by the wrongful and
malicious act of the defendant, committed with a full knowledge that
he was violating the plaintiff's rights and with the intent to injure him."
This early case holding malice an essential element of the tort thus
falls under Class III, of cases which define malice as the intent to injure
the plaintiff.
Among other analogous early American cases are Andrews v. Black-
eslee8" and Marsh v. Billings,3" decided in 1851, two years before Lull-
ley v. Gye, in both of which the court allowed the action. In Randall
v. Hazelton,36 however, decided in Mass. in 1866, the court did not al-
low the action. These cases are not important in considering the ques-
tion of malice but they are of interest as showing the tendency of the
courts to allow the action in similar cases prior to Lumley v. Gye.
The early history of the action in the United States can best be traced
by looking to one of the state jurisdictions, which first allow the action.
Turning then to one of the most important jurisdictions in the country,
we find a Massachusetts court allowing the action in one of the oft-
cited American cases on this action, Walker v. Cronin,37 decided in
1871. The plaintiff in that case was a shoe manufacturer, and the de-
fendant induced many shoemakers in the plaintiff's employ to leave his
service, and induced others to refuse to perform their contracts to make
shoes for the plaintiff. The court allowed the action both for enticing
away employees and for inducing breach of a contract, holding that
they were intentional acts done with the unlawful purpose of causing
damage to the plaintiff "without justifiable cause on the part of the de-
fendant, (which constitutes malice)." Judge Wells cited the Comyn's
Digest passage already quoted, and such cases as Keeble v. Hickeringill,
supra, as authority for stating that even where no contract rights exist,
an action will lie for malicious wrong. The plaintiff, (he says), in the
34 (1867) 12 Ia. 577. This case is not strictly one of inducing breach of con-
tract, but is similar. The defendant agreed to convey land to a third person
who was indebted to the plaintiff on a promissory note, and who had promised
the plaintiff to convey the lands to him as security; the deeds had been exe-
cuted and placed in escrow in the hands of one B who was to deliver them;
and the defendant knowing that the plaintiff relied on the conveyance for his
security had sold the land to an innocent purchaser, intending to deprive the
plaintiff of his security. The court allowed the action.
U 61 Mass. 322. This was a case in which a hotel proprietor agreed with a
livery stable keeper to carry passengers to and from his hotel, and a third per-
son held himself out as having the patronage of the hotel keeper and induced
passengers to ride with him. The court allowed the action in behalf of the
livery stable keeper against the third person.
" 94 Mass. (12 Allen) 412. The holder of a power of sale mortgage volun-
tarily promised the mortgagor's vendee in possession not to act under the
power without giving him personal notice. A third person falsely represented
to the promissor that the vendee in possession desired the assignment and per-
suaded the promissor to assign it to him, after which he sold the premises
while the vendee in possession was absent from home. The court held the
action by the vendee in possession versus the assignee and the purchaser did not
lie, although the plaintiff was thereby compelled to pay the purchaser an uncon-
scionable sum to obtain title. " 107 Mass., 555.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol12/iss4/7
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absence of contract rights has no right to be protected from competition
but he has a right to be free from malicious and wanton interference.
As the defendant's demurrer admits the absence of any justifiable cause,
the court does not consider the question of what constitutes just cause.
Walker v. Cronin, thus is one of the early authorities for the maxim
that interference with a contract without just cause is malicious, and
sets an early precedent for evading the issue of justifiable cause. As
the court did not define "malice," it is difficult to classify the case; the
facts would support the definition that malice was the intent to injure
the plaintiff (Class III) for the defendant was not a competitor and had
no motive apparently but spite toward the plaintiff; but the case is later
cited as authority for the definition that malice is the intentional in-
ducing of the breach without just cause (Class I). 38
A few years later a Massachusetts court in the case of Moran v.
Dunphy 9 held that maliciously to induce an employer to discharge his
employee was actionable, using "malice" apparently in the sense of
"malevolence" (Class III).
One of the most important Massachusetts cases on this subject is
Beekinan v. Marsters," the famous tourist agency case in which the
defendant's motive in inducing breach of the contract was trade com-
petition. The plaintiff was proprietor of a tourist agency and had a
"It is not to be supposed that all the state jurisdictions allowed the action at
this time; Massachusetts was in advance of many of them. Looking for in-
stance to the West, we find the Missouri courts in the eighties unfavorable to
the action. McCann v. Wolff, 28 Mo. App. 447, (1888), a case for preventing
"by means unknown to plaintiff" a sale of land which he had negotiated with a
third person. The defendant's demurrer was sustained, the court holding that
no action lies in the absence of both fraud and malice. "There must be a
wrongful attempt to harm the plaintiff before the right of action for procuring
a breach of contract can be established. Mere knowledge that there is a sub-
sisting contract will not do." This is then a case belonging to Class II, holding
that malice is the intent to injure the plaintiff. Lally v. Cantwell, 30 Mo. App.
524 (1888), also decided by the St. Louis Court of Appeals, is not properly
speaking a case for this cause of action for the plaintiff had no employment
contract, but it is of interest in view of Glencoe Land Com. case, cited below,
to see that the court allowed the action even though no contract existed, on the
principle of Keeble v. Hickeringill, that the plaintiff may have an action for the
intentional wrong done him by the defendant. In 1896, however, in the Glen-
coe Land & Gravel Co. v. Hudson Commission Co. case, 138 Mo. 439, the Su-
preme Court of Missouri held that no action lies for inducing breach of con-
tract except where the relation of master and servant exists.
Likewise, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky in the admirable opinion of
Judge Lewis in Chambers et al. v. Baldwin, 91 Ky. 121 (1891), on the authority
of Cooley refused to allow the action in a contract for the sale of goods where
the defendant induced the breach with intent to injure the plaintiff and to
benefit himself in the plaintiff's stead. Two years later in Bourlier et al. v.
Macauley, 91 Ky. 135 (1893), the same court refused to allow the action for
breach of an employment contract.
California, also, in Boyson v. Thorne, 98 Cal. 578 (1893), refused to allow
the action.
N. Y. too, was at first hostile to the action: Daly v. Cornwall, 54 N. Y. S.
107 (1898) ; De Jong v. Behrman, 131 N. Y. S. 1083 (1911).
See also Brown Hardware Co. v. Ind. Shoe Works, 69 S. W. 805, (Tex.,
1902).
' 177 Mass. 485 (1901), Holmes, C. J. ' 195 Mass. 205 (1907).
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contract with a hotel, appointing him its exclusive agent within a certain
territory to secure patronage, and defendant induced the hotel to employ
him also as agent. The court, citing Walker v. Cronin, supra, and
Read v. Friendly Society of Operative Stonemasons,41 held that it was
not sufficient justification for inducing the breach that the defendants
acted bona fide for their own interest, i. e. that trade competition was
no justification. "Their justification for interference must be an equal
or superior right in themselves and no one can excuse himself . . . on
the ground that he acted under a wrong understanding of his own
rights or without malice, or bona fide or in the best interests of him-
self or even as an altruist seeking only the good of another . . . " To
induce the breach intentionally and without just cause is to act ma-
liciously. The case, then, comes under the second group of cases in
Class I.
McGurk v. Cronenuett,42 a case of inducing breach of an employment
contract, decided in a Massachusetts court in 1908, upholds this decision,
and determines an interesting question of procedure involving the defini-
tion of "malice." The first count of the allegation contained no aver-
ment that the defendant had committed any act in itself actionable, be-
cause there was no averment that the defendant knew of the existence
of the agreement, unless that is implied in the word "maliciously." The
court held the count insufficient to support a cause of action, because
"where this is the sole cause of action relied on, it is necessary both to
aver and prove the defendant's knowledge of the contract." The charge
that the defendant "maliciously" prevented the plaintiff from perform-
ing his obligations under his agreement does not necessarily import an
allegation that the defendant knew of the agreement. The natural
meaning of the word "maliciously" is "wilfully and intentionally."
Quoting from Justice Bayley in Bronmage v. Prosser,43 the court said
"malice in its legal sense means a wrongful act, done intentionally with-
out just cause or excuse." In spite of this last definition, the opinion in
effect places the case under the second group of Class I.4 4
The United State Supreme Court in 1893 for the first time (Federal
decisions) allowed the action in the case of Angle v. St. Paul, Minne-
apolis & Omaha Ry. Co.45 The third and fourth counts were for in-
ducing breach of contract, the defendant having persuaded the Legis-
lature by false representations to revoke the grant of the Portage Com-
pany and to bestow the lands on itself, resorting to bribery and false
allegations. The court held that "such wrongful use of the powers and
processes of the court cannot be recognized as among the legitimate
means of contest and competition. It makes the interference with the
affairs of the Portage Company a wrongful interference." The case
was clearly one of fraud and the court did not go into the question of
what constitutes malice, thought it cited Lumley v. Gye, Bowen v. Hall,
' Read v. Friendly Soc. (1902), 2 K. B. 88.
"McGurk v. Cronenwett, 199 Mass. 457. '4 B. & C. 247, 255.
"For later Massachusetts cases, see Wheeler-Stenzel Co. v. American Win-
dow Glass Co. (1909), 202 Mass. 471, and Tracy v. Osborne, 226 Mass. 29 & 237
Mass. 537. " 151 U. S. 1.
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Walker v. Cronin,46 Rice v. Manley,47 Jones v. Stanly,"8 Haskins v.
Royster,49 with approval.
In Heath et a/ v. American Book Co.,50 the Circuit Court of West
Virginia held the defendant liable for inducing breach of a contract for
the sale of textbooks. Plaintiff had a contract to supply certain text-
books adopted by act of the legislature, for use in the public schools,
and defendant with knowledge of the contract induced the school board
to discard the plaintiff's books and purchase his. There was no allega-
tion of malice or ill-will toward the plaintiff; the defendant simply sub-
mitted his own publication, a revised English grammar, to the school
boards, knowing of the existing contract with the plaintiff. The malice
then, if any, is that defined in Class I (a) but the court does not discuss
- the question. The case is of interest as showing the tendency of the
courts to allow the action even in gale contracts where the defendant's
only motive was competition.
So also in Tubular Rivet & Stud Co. v. Exeter Boot & Shoe Co.,r'
the Circuit Court of Appeals held that where the defendant corpora-
tion induced another to break a contract to furnish certain machines,
the plaintiff could recover without proof that the defendant was actuated
by malice, (i. e. malevolence) or ill-will. The court held malice to
be nothing more than inducing the breach with knowledge that a con-
tract existed, (Class Ia) and quoted Lord Herschell in Allen v. Flood:
that "Maliciously" means inducing the breach "wilfully and with notice
of the contract."
In the famous Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 2 the Su-
preme Court held that although one who maliciously interferes with a
contract is liable, yet in this case the contract sued on was invalid and
the plaintiffs cannot recover on it. Dr. Miles Medical Company sold
on a system of contracts by which the Medical Company controlled
prices of goods sold by its agents and prices for all sales by all dealers
at wholesale or retail. The court held these contracts, fixing re-sale
prices and eliminating competition, were in restraint of trade and in-
valid under the common law and the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. No
dicta on malice are determined, as the majority held the contract in-
valid, but Justice Holmes dissented, holding the contract valid: "We
greatly exaggerate the value and importance to the public of competi-
tion, . . . as fixing a fair price .. .with regard to things like Dr.
Miles' Medicine the point of most profitable returns marks the equili-
brium of social desires and determines the fair price."
The Circuit Court of Appeals in 1913 decided the case of American
Malting Co. v. Keital5 3 Here the defendant had sent out libelous
circulars concerning the plaintiff, a malting corporation. Plaintiff sues
for maliciously inducing interference with its contracts. The court in
allowing the action said: "We fail to discover any satisfactory dis-
Supra, note 37. 4166 N. Y. 82, in which fraud was proved.
76 N. C. 355 (1874), Malice as defined in Class I.
- 70 N. C. 601 (1870), Malice as defined in Class I.
97 Fed. 533 (1899). M 159 Fed. Rep. 824 (1908).
0220 U. S. 373. 5209 Fed. 351 (C. C. A.).
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tinction between an attempt to induce employes to break a contract of
sale and an attempt to induce customers to break their business con-
tracts for the purchase and sale of goods." The action lies for both.
The opinion is of interest as showing the tendency of the courts to
broaden the action,-the intimation here is that it would lie even for
breach of contracts induced by underselling,-and the tendency likewise
to ignore the question of malice. The defendant was actuated by
malevolence in inducing the breach, but the court takes no notice of his
motive. (Class Ia.)
In Hodge v. Meyer,5" the same court refused to allow the action be-
cause the plaintiffs who sue in their individual capacity and not as share-
holders of the Railway Company were not shown to have been damaged
by the alleged wrongful interference with contract. The court here
ignores the issue of malice. The Circuit Court of Appeals (Second
Circuit) likewise ignores the issue of malice in a recent decision.5 5
From these last-cited cases, it will be seen that the tendency of modern
American courts is to allow the action without regard to malice, legal
or otherwise, or else to allow the action for maliciously inducing a
breach of contract, i. e. inducing it intentionally without lawful justifi-
cation (Class Ia). They throw no light on the question of what
justification will exonerate one from such malice.
For the most recent decisions and dicta on malice, we turn again to
the state jurisdictions. New York Courts have veered from their
early stand on "malice" and come to the idea that malice in this action
is intentionally inducing breach of the contract without just cause
(Class Ia). Campbell v. Gates6 decided in 1923 was a case for inter-
ference with an employment contract, and inducing an assistant to the
plaintiff, a magazine publisher, to leave his service. The court allowed
the action on the authority of Lamb v. Cheney,57 holding that "malice"
is not actual ill-will but the intentional interference with the contract
without lawful justification (Class Ib). Again in Goodinan Bros. v.
Ashton" in 1925, the court allowed the action on the authority of
Lamb v. Cheney and Posner v. Jackson,"' both of which support this
last definition (Class Ib).
Recent decisions in Massachusetts, 0 Maryland 61 and Georgia62 also
support this dictum (Class Ib), but it is to Wisconsin that we turn for
the most interesting of the late cases, the North Wisconsin Tobacco
Pool v. Bekkedal.63 The plaintiff corporation was a farmers' co-
6perative tobacco pool, the members of which were farmers who agreed
"(1918) 252 Fed. 479.U Second National Bank v. M. Samuel & Sons, 12 F (2 d.) 963, (May, 1926).
For other federal decisions see Sweeney v. Smith, 171 Fed. 645; Dail Overland
Co. v. Willys Overland (D. C.) 263 F. 171; Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v.
Diamonid State Fibre Co. (D. C.) 268 F. 121; Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v.
Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229; Eagle Glass & Mfg. Co. v. Rowe, 245 U. S. 275.
" 236 N. Y. 457 (1923).
" Lamb v. Cheney, 227 N. Y. 418, breach of an employment contract.
"208 N. Y. 83 (1925). "*223 N. Y. 325.
" 137 N. E. 919, Moore Drop Forging Co. v. McCarthy et al. (1923).
0 133 A. 843, Goldman v. Harford Road Bldg. Ass'n. et al. (1926).
"Luke v. Du Pree, 124 S. E. 13 (1924). - 197 N. W. 936 (1924).
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to sell all their tobacco crops to the association. The defendants, to-
bacco merchants, were unable to secure sufficient tobacco; their busi-
ness was threatened, and to break up the pool, they induced its members
to sell tobacco crops to them, promising to indemnify them for any
damages that should result from breach of contracts with the plaintiff
association. The defense relied on the theory that in the interest of
free trade and competition, they had a right to purchase products offered
in the open market, even though thereby causing a breach of contract.!'
But the court held that the action would lie because the defendants' in-
terference with the contracts was a malicious interference. "There is
some confusion in the authorities as to what constitutes malicious inter-
ference," the opinion reads, but as cobperative associations among
farmers are favored by law and statute, the defendants' act in attempt-
ing to break the organization and eliminate undesirable competition was
malicious. The case is interesting as showing a tendency to allow the
action in contracts of sale, but the decision is perhaps based on the
peculiar status of the plaintiff corporation. In 1925 this case was cited
with approval in Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Lang."
These latter-day cases all point to a liberal definition of malice (Class
Ib), relying on the statement that malice is inducing breach of the con-
tract without just cause, but they offer no explanation of what consti-
tutes just cause, and the facts of the cases support no general inferences.
Whether the action should lie in certain labor union cases, against
officers of a labor union for inducing a bona fide breach of contract, (as
in the Glamorgan Coal Company Case) or against a Union official for
inducing a manufacturer to break his contract (as in the R. & W. Hat
Shop Inc. v. Sculley6"), whether it should lie for inducing breach of con-
tracts of sale as certain decisions seem to indicate, 7 are still unsettled
questions.
As to what constitutes "malice," one cannot but agree with the
opinion of Lord Lindley, that the distinction between legal and lay
malice should be done away with:
"My Lords, I have purposely abstained from using the word 'malice.'
Bearing in mind that malice may or may not be used to denote ill-will,
and that in legal language, presumptive or implied malice is distinguish-
able from express malice, it conduces to clearness in discussing such
cases as these to drop the word 'malice' altogether, and to substitute for
it the meaning which is really intended to be conveyed by it. Its use
may be necessary in drawing indictments; but when all that is meant
by malice is an intention to commit an unlawful act without reference
to spite or ill-feeling, it is better to drop the word malice and so avoid
all misunderstanding." KATHLEEN GREEN, '29.
"Citizens' Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Montgomery Light & Water Power
Company, 171 Fed. 553; Sweeney v. Smith, 171 Fed. 645.
'203 N. W. 399 (Wis. 1925).
' 118 Atl. 55. See also YALE LAW JOURNAL 32, 171, "Privilege of Labor Union
to Induce a Breach of Contract."
Morgan v. Andrews, 107 Mich. 33; Jackson v. Stanfield, 37 Ind. 592. Courts
never actually allow the action for underselling, however.
' South Wales Miners' Federation v. Glamorgan Coal Co., supra, note 2.
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